Legal Ethics - A Few Things You Should Know by Smith, N. Gregory
Annual Institute on Mineral Law 
Volume 45 The 45th Annual Institute on Mineral 
Law Article 16 
3-26-1998 
Legal Ethics - A Few Things You Should Know 
N. Gregory Smith 
Louisiana State University Law Center, nsmith3@lsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings 
 Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Smith, N. Gregory (1998) "Legal Ethics - A Few Things You Should Know," Annual Institute on Mineral Law: 
Vol. 45 , Article 16. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol45/iss1/16 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Mineral Law Institute at LSU Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Annual Institute on Mineral Law by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
Legal Ethics - A Few Things You Should Know 
N. Gregory Smith 
Associate Professor 
LSU Law Center 
I. 
Introduction In recent years, there have been frequent and substantial changes in the 
laws and rules that govern the legal profession. Most of the changes have 
occurred at the state level, but the practice of law can also be, and often is, 
significantly affected by new rules or decisions of federal courts, and it is 
sometimes affected by acts of the United States Congress. Moreover, 
decisions of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility can influence how state disciplinary authorities apply the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, a program on legal ethics 
should deal with more than state-level developments. At the same time, 
it 
should be acknowledged that, every year, there are more professional 
responsibility developments than can reasonably be catalogued in written 
materials for an hour-long CLE presentation on the subject. As a result, 
only selected developments are referenced here. 
II. In the News 
A. 
California and Mandatory CLE 
Not all lawyers are pleased to be subject to mandatory CLE 
requirements. A California lawyer recently expressed his displeasure 
in 
the courts. 
Warden, a 73 year old California lawyer, was placed on inactive status 
for failure to comply with mandatory CLE requirements. He sued the State 
Bar, claiming that the California CLE scheme was unconstitutional. More 
particularly, Warden claimed that exemptions from the CLE requirements 
for state officials, retired judges, and law professors lacked any rational 
basis and that the scheme therefore violated equal protection. A California 
appellate court agreed, and ordered reinstatement of Warden's right to 
practice law. 
The court said: 
In sum, we hold the CLE program is unconstitutional. It violates equal 
protection by forcing some attorneys licensed by the Bar who represent 
individual clients in private practice, and not others, to comply with 
the program for reasons having no rational relationship to a legitimate 
state interest. 
62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49-50. 
Warden may not be successful in the end. The California Supreme 
Court has granted the State Bar's petition for review, superseding the 
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decision ofthe appellate court. Warden v. State BarofCalifornia,62 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 938 P.2d 371 (Cal. 1997) 
B. Crash Victim Solicitation 
In October 1996, federal legislation was adopted that prohibits lawyers 
from soliciting victims of aircraft accidents, or their families, until 30 days 
after the accident. The anti-solicitation provision was added to the Federal 
Aviation Reauthorization Act. The new provision states: 
In the event ofan accident involving an air carrier providing interstate 
or foreign air transportation, no unsolicited communication concerning a 
potential action for personal injury or wrongful death may be made by an 
attorney or any potential party to the litigation to an individual injured 
in 
the accident, or to a relative of an individual involved in the accident, before 
the 30th day following the date of the accident. 
49 U.S.C. § 
1
136(g)(2). 
The legislation also provides for a monetary penalty for violation of 
the no-solicitation rule. See 49 U.S.C. § 1155(a). 
Of course, lawyers have long been prohibited, by state ethics rules, 
from making direct solicitations to non-clients. Rule 7.2(a) of the Louisiana 
Rules of Professional Conduct says that 
[a] lawyer shall not solicit professional employment in person, by 
person to person verbal telephone contact or through others acting at 
his request or on his behalf from a prospective client with whom the 
lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when 
a 
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary 
gain. 
In March of 1996, the Louisiana Supreme Court amended Rule 7.2 of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct to prohibit Louisiana lawyers from 
sending targeted written solicitations to accident victims within 30 days of 
the accident. See Rule 7.2(b), Rules ofProfessional Conduct. In short, the 
Louisiana rules already prohibit much of the conduct covered by the new 
federal legislation. 
C. Malpractice 
The ABA Journal provided some interesting "estimates" on the subject 
of legal malpractice. Estimated annual amount of U.S. compensatory 
awards for legal malpractice: $5.8 billion. Estimated annual amount of 
punitive damages for legal malpractice: $580 million. Estimated percentage 
of lawyers who do not carry malpractice insurance: 40 percent. Percentage 
chance in a given year that a lawyer in private practice will face a legal 
malpractice claim: 20 percent. 
FigurativelySpeaking, ABA Journal, Oct. 1996, at 12. 
A recent report by the ABA shows that "[b]y far" the types of activities 
that draw the most claims of malpractice are "commencement of 
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action/proceeding" and "preparation, filing, transmittal of documents." 
These activities together make up about 45 percent of all claims. 
ABA Report Examines New Data on Legal Malpractice Claims, 13 
ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 110 (April 30, 
1997). 
D. Communications with Represented Persons 
Model Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 
Where adopted, this rule has often been interpreted to prevent contacts 
with employees of represented organizations. Federal prosecutors, in 
particular, are unhappy with state ethics rules that forbid them from 
contacting employees of organizations that are represented by attorneys. 
Attorney General Janet Reno has issued a regulation that purports to exempt 
lawyers of the federal government from such state rules. Recently, a 
decision of the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated 
the Justice 
Department's 
regulation. See U.S. ex rel.O'Keefe v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1998). The court said that the 
attorney general had no authority to issue such a regulation. 
Coincidentally, the Conference of Chief Justices is giving some 
thought to a proposed change to Model Rule 4.2. In its current draft form, 
the new rule would widen the scope ofpermissible contacts by government 
lawyers. Among other things, the proposed rule would bar government 
lawyers from communicating only with members of a represented 
organization's "control group." See News, 14 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual 
on Professional Conduct 20 (Feb. 2. 1998); Legal News, US Law Week, 
January 20, 1998 (vol 66, no 27, page 2421). 
E. Restatement 
The ALI's work continues on its draft Restatement of the Law 
GoverningLawyers. The ALI has now tentatively approved five the planned 
nine restatement chapters. Charles Wolfram, the chief reporter for the 
project, predicts that the restatement will be completed in 1999. 
Proposed sections on lawyer civil liability prompted the most debate at 
last years' ALI meeting. One of the provisions that received a lot of 
attention was one that would have imposed tort liability on lawyers for an 
intentional breach of any fiduciary duty set forth in any other part of the 
restatement, at least when such breach causes damages. So, for example, 
a 
lawyer would be liable, under the proposed rule, for an intentional violation 
of the obligation to maintain client confidences or of the obligation to avoid 
conflicts of interest when the client is damaged by the violation. 
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The principal debate was over the appearance of the word 
"intentional." Why, it was argued, should a lawyer only be liable for an 
intentional breach ofa fiduciary duty? After considerable discussion, and 
on a very close vote, the word "intentional" was dropped. So, under the 
new tentative rule, a lawyer could be liable to a client in tort for any breach 
of a fiduciary duty. However, at the moment there is other language in the 
restatement indicating that liability will be appropriate only to the extent 
provided by law governing breach of fiduciary duty. 
See Restatement on Lawyers, 65 U.S.L.W. 2781 (1997). 
It is not clear how all of this is going to come out. Of course, even 
when the restatement is completed, it will not be binding authority. But it 
may have considerable persuasive influence on questions like lawyer 
liability. So there is something at stake in the ALI's debates. 
F. Ethics 2000 
Perhaps not to be outdone by the ALI, the ABA itself has launched 
a 
comprehensive study ofthe rules of lawyer conduct. The initiative, called 
Ethics 2000, is supposed to result in the creation of a special committee to 
assess the ethics rules before the turn of the century. 
It has been only 15 years since the ABA generated its Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which form the basis of the professional 
responsibility rules in Louisiana and most other states. The new initiative 
could, of course, result in the promulgation of some new rules, or even 
a 
new code ofrules. 
ABA Starts "Ethics2000" Project ForSweeping Review of Rules, 
ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, May 28, 1997. 
G. Zero Fees 
A recent unreported decision from Colorado shows what can happen 
when a lawyer charges an unreasonable fee. (Eich v. Gregory A. Maceau 
P.C., Colo. Ct. App., No. 96CA1354, 11/28/97, referred to in News, 
14 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 20 (Feb. 4, 1998). 
Irene Eich was injured in an automobile accident by an uninsured, 
intoxicated, driver. Attorney Maceau was hired to represent her on 
a 
standard one-third contingency fee contract. Maceau made a $100,000 
demand on Eich's insurer, because Eich carried $100,000 of uninsured 
coverage. Eich had already incurred over $70,000 in medical expenses. The 




Eich subsequently discharged Maceau, and sued him, claiming that his 
fee was unreasonable. The jury found that Maceau did not prove the 
reasonableness of his fee, and determined that the value of his services was 
zero. The court cited Rule 1.5 for the proposition that contingent fee 
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ordered Maceau to refund the entire fee. 
Maceau claimed that he had worked over 44 hours on the case, but the 
court accepted the jury's conclusion that there was no value to the services 
that he had provided. Commenting on this result, Lester Brickman, an 
advocate for contingent fee reform said: "Contingent fee cases of this sort 
are a form of theft." News, 14 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on 
Professional Conduct 21 (Feb. 4, 1998). 
H. Bias and Prejudice 
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility has proposed a revision to Model Rule 8.4(d) of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. The current rule prohibits lawyers from 
engaging in conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice." The 
committee would like the Comment that accompanies the rule to include the 
following paragraph: 
A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly 
manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, 
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-
economic status violates paragraph (d) when such actions are 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy 
respecting the forgoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). 
Earlier proposals of a similar nature have proven to be controversial 
and have not been adopted. Illinois law professor Ronald Rotunda discerns 
First Amendment problems with the new proposal, because it applies to 
words as well as conduct. 
Legal News, 66 U.S. Law Week 2342, 2343 (Dec. 9,1997) 
III. Selected Opinions from Outside Louisiana 




938 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn. 1996) 
Blount, a Tennessee lawyer, got into trouble after ajury verdict did not 
go his way. He represented the plaintiff in a personal injury action. The 
jury returned a verdict of $35,000 in favor of his client. After the verdict 
was read, Blount directed a "thumbs down" gesture to the jury, and 
muttered that the verdict was "unjust." Before the conclusion of the 
proceedings, Blount abruptly exited the courtroom, waving his hands in the 
air, and complaining about a travesty of justice. Later, in the hallway 
outside the courtroom, Blount approached some of the jurors and angrily 
said he hoped that they "could live with themselves." 938 S.W.2d at 396. 
He also pushed and jabbed his opponent, telling him that "You're the most 
unethical attorney Iknow, you defrauded the Court and jury throughout this 
entire trial, and you lied to the Court and jury." Id. 
Blount was charged with and convicted of two counts of criminal 
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contempt of court. 
B. Working Too Hard 
In re Fordham 
668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996) cert. denied, 117. S.Ct. 1082 (U.S. 1997) 
Fordham, a Massachusetts attorney, was publicly censured for 
overbilling a 21 year old client who was charged with operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Fordham's client 
was taken into custody after failing a field sobriety test. The police found a 
partially full quart bottle ofvodka in his car. Subsequent breathalyzer tests 
for the client registered .10 and .12 respectively. 
Fordham billed by the hour. His bills showed 227 hours of time spent 
on the defense. The total billed for the defense, which was successful, was 
$50,022.25. Even though it was conceded that the attorney acted diligently 
and in good faith, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the 
hours billed were excessive. The court said that the usual fee for this type 
of case was less than 1/3 of the amount billed. 
The court thought that many of the hours spent on the case were 
attributable to the lawyer's inexperience with criminal matters in general 
and with intoxication cases in particular. It said: 
Fordham's inexperience in criminal defense work and OUI cases in 
particular cannot justify the extraordinarily high fee. It cannot be that 
an inexperienced lawyer is entitled to charge three or four times as 
much as an experienced-lawyer for the same service. A client "should 
not be expected to pay for the education of a lawyer when he spends 
excessive amounts of time on tasks which, with reasonable experience, 
become matters of routine." 
668 N.E.2d at 822-823 (quoting In reLarsen, 694 P.2d 1051 (Wash. 
1985). 
C. Bad Bills 
In re Berg 
3 Cal. Stat Bar Ct. Rptr., 1997 WL 469003 (Cal. Bar Ct. 1997) 
Berg, a California lawyer, engaged in fraudulent billing practices. He 
had been retained to represent dentists in 41 malpractice actions. The 
dentists were covered by insurance by The Dentists Insurance Company, 
which agreed to pay $150 an hour for the representation. Between March 
and December 1997, the insurance company paid Berg in excess of 
$357,000. Most charges were billed at $150 an hour, but some were billed, 
without notice, at $175 an hour. 
Berg regularly billed the insurance company for work before it was 
actually performed, but the billing statements nonetheless showed a date 
the services were purportedly rendered, a description of those services, and 
the time that was allegedly spent in performing the work. The lawyer's 
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billing statements frequently indicated that he had worked more than 24 
hours a day. On some days, he billed for more than 100 hours of work. 
Berg had an employee count the pages of documents received 
in 
particular cases, and multiply that number by three minutes to determine the 
hours to be billed. Berg described his method as "bulk billing." 
He did not prepare pleadings, memoranda, or other evidence 
of 
productive work on the files in question. He had no time records to support 
the billings. Berg claimed that the time records had been destroyed within 
90 to 180 days after each billing. 
In the disciplinary proceedings, the lawyer claimed that he later 
performed the work for which he had billed. But the disciplinary authorities 
were unimpressed. The billing statement were fraudulent when issued. The 
insurance company ultimately received a judgment against Berg for 
$286,000. The disciplinary court recommended that Berg be disbarred. 
D. Structured Settlement and Time Value of Money 
In re Fox 
490 S.E.2d 265 (S.C. 1997) (per curiam) 
South Carolina attorney LaVaun Fox was publicly reprimanded for 
collecting a clearly excessive fee in a contingency fee case. Fox had been 
associated with another attorney, Screen, to work on a wrongful death case. 
The client had agreed to a 1/3 contingency fee arrangement. The case 
settled. The settlement provided for an immediate cash payment of 
$175,000, and some annuities. When Screen received the lump sum 
payment of $175,000, he took out $152,132 in attorneys' fees, $51,000 of 
which were allocated to Fox. 
The client brought an action for accounting with respect to the fee, and 
there was a settlement in which Screen and Fox acknowledged error in the 
calculation of the fee. Thereafter, disciplinary proceedings were undertaken 
against Fox. The court described the "problem" as follows: 
The problem in this case centers around the manner in which Screen 
and Respondent valued the wrongful death settlement (more 
specifically, the annuities made part of the settlement), and how they 
collected their fee out of it. When they were calculating the 
settlement, they did not discount the annuities to present value. 




[and] valued the entire settlement at $371,340. From this, 
they calculated their attorneys' fee at $123,255. 
490 S.E.2d at 268. 
An additional fee of $28,877 was paid to another attorney who had worked 
on an aspect of the case, bringing the total to $152,132. 
The court then said: 
It is well-settled that in valuing structured settlements like the one 
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here, the cost method should be used..... The premium paid to purchase 
the annuity contracts here was $110,818. When added to the initial 
$175,000 case payment, the settlement would be valued at $285,818. 
Thus, using this figure, a one-third contingency fee would be 
approximately $95,000. If the settlement's value had been 
appropriately discounted, it is obvious the fees paid here were 
excessive.... 
Valuing the settlement based on guaranteed future payments or total 
cash payout would most likely not have presented an ethical problem 
had the fee not then been taken up-front (i.e. out of present-day 
dollars). A basic understanding of the value of money over time 
would indicate this method, of taking the fee from present-day dollars 
but not valuing the annuity at present-day dollars, would result in a 
windfall for the attorneys. 
Id.
at 268-69. 
And even though Screen did the calculations on the fees, the court said 
that it was appropriate to discipline Fox. Fox had been included in the 
settlement discussions, he was aware of how the settlement was being 
valued for purposes ofcalculating attorneys' fees, and how the fees were 
to 
be paid from up-front money. So he was publicly reprimanded. 
E. Confidentiality 
One of the most basic duties of a lawyer is to maintain the 
confidentiality of client information. Rule 1.6(a) of the Rules 
of 
Professional Conduct provides, among other things, that "[a] lawyer shall 
not reveal information relating to representation ofa client unless the client 
consents after consultation." Rule 1.8(b) further provides that "A lawyer 
shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the 
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation." 
Sometimes a lawyer can encounter more than ethical problems with respect 
to the misuse of client information. 
U.S. v. O'Hagan 
117 S.Ct. 2199 (U.S. 1997) 
The Dorsey law firm was engaged to represent Grand Met in 
a 
proposed acquisition of the Pillsbury Co. A Dorsey lawyer, who was not 
involved in the representation itself, learned of the proposed acquisition, 
and began to buy shares ofstock and options in Pillsbury. When he started 
his purchases, Pillsbury was selling for $39 per share. After Grand Met 
announced 
a 
tender offer, the price rose to nearly $60 per share. The lawyer 
made a $4.3 million profit. 
The SEC investigated. The lawyer was indicted for defrauding his law 
firm and his client by using non-public information for his own trading 
purposes. He was alleged to have used the profits to conceal previous 
embezzlement and conversion of client trust funds. He was convicted and 
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sentenced to prison. 
The lawyer in this case was an "outsider," rather than a company 
"insider." The principal issue before the Court was whether he could be 
properly convicted of securities fraud for making unauthorized use of 
company information for personal gain. The Court said yes. 
The Court said that a fiduciary who pretends loyalty to the principal 
while secretly converting the principal's information for personal gain 
defrauds the principal. 117 S. Ct. at 2208. "A company's confidential 
information ... qualifies as property to which the company has a right of 
exclusive use. The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in 
violation ofa fiduciary duty ...constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement." Id. 
(citations omitted). Furthermore, if such misappropriation occurs in 
connection with the purchase of securities, and without disclosure to the 
principal, the misappropriator may violate federal law. Said the Court: 
We turn next to the §l0(b) requirement that the misappropriator's 
deceptive use of information be "in connection with the purchase 
or 
sale of [a] security." This element is satisfied because the fiduciary's 
fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential 
information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the 
information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction 
and the breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the 
person or entity defrauded is not the other party to the trade, but is, 
instead, the source of the nonpublic information.... A misappropriator 
who trades on the basis ofmaterial, nonpublic information ...gains his 
advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the 
source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the 
investing public. 
Id. 
However, the Court said that if the government were to succeed with 
its misappropriation theory it would also need to show that there had been 
a willful violation ofRule 
1
Ob-5 and that the defendant had knowledge of the 
rule. The Court also concluded that the lawyer's conduct could be found to 
violate Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3(a), which prohibit securities trading 
based on material non-public information about a tender offer. The critical 
point, of course, is that a lawyer who "misappropriates" client information 
could be subject to criminal liability. 
F. Insurance Company Control of Settlement 
Formal Opinion 96-403 
ABA Ethics Committee 
In this opinion, issued August 
2, 
1996, the ABA Ethics Committee 
considered a problem that comes up in insurance cases: how does the 
lawyer, hired by the insurer to represent the insured, deal with a provision 
in 
the insurance policy that authorizes the insurer to control the defense and 
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settlement of the claim in its sole discretion, without consultation with the 
insured? 
The Committee initially noted that the insurance contract itself does 
not define the lawyer's ethical obligations, and that the "essential point of 
ethics involved is that the lawyer so employed shall represent the insured as 
his client with undivided fidelity." Opinion at 
2. 
If the lawyer is to 
proceed with the representation at the direction of the insurer, the 
Committee said that the lawyer must "make appropriate disclosure 
sufficient to apprise the insured of the limited nature of the representation as 
well as the insurer's right to control the defense." Id. 
The Committee considered the potential relevance of Model Rule 1.2, 
which provides, in part, that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision 
concerning the objectives ofrepresentation," and that "[a] lawyer may limit 
the objectives of the representation 
if 
the client consents after consultation." 
In this situation, the Committee said the lawyer's obligations would be 
satisfied by a "short letter clearly stating that the lawyer intends to proceed 
at the direction of the insurer in accordance with the terms of the insurance 
contract and what this means to the insured." Id. No formal acceptance by 
the client of this arrangement is necessary, said the Committee. The insured 
would manifest consent to the limited representation by accepting the 
offered defense after being advised of the terms on which it is offered. 
If insurer and insured should later disagree about whether a proposed 
settlement is acceptable, or about who has the right to decide that question, 
the Committee said that the attorney may consult with his client or clients as 
to a proposed course ofaction, or advise them to seek independent counsel. 
Thus, for example, the lawyer might remind the insured that the policy 
gives the insurer the right to control the defense and settle the claim without 
the consent of the insured or that rejecting the proposed settlement might 
result in a forfeiture of rights under the policy. Ultimately, however, 
although the insurer hired the lawyer and pays his fee, the insured retains 
the power to reject the defense offered by the insurer under the policy and 
to assume the risk and expense of his own defense. Id. at 
3. 
In most cases, noted the Committee, an insured would be delighted to 
have litigation resolved within policy limits. It said: 
So long as the lawyer has apprised the insured of the limitations on the 
representation offered under the insurance policy and the insurer's 
right to settle the matter ... and the lawyer does not know that the 
insured objects to the proposed settlement within policy limits, the 
lawyer may follow the directions of the insurer to settle, without 
further communication with the insured. In the unusual case addressed 
in this opinion, however, where the lawyer knows that the insured 
objects to a settlement within policy limits, the lawyer must give the 
insured an opportunity to reject the defense offered by the insurer and 
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to assume responsibility for his own defense at his own expense. 
Id. at 3-4. 
G. Conflicts of Interest When Representing Lawyers 
The principal conflict of interest rule is Rule 1.7. The Louisiana 
version provides: 
Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. 
Therefore: 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of 
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) 
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not 
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and 
(2) 
Each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client 
if 
the representation of 
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, 
unless: 
(1) 
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and 
(2) 
The client consents after consultation. When representation 
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the 
consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks involved. 
A recent decision of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility discusses some conflicts that can arise when 
one lawyer takes on the representation of another. 
Formal Opinion 97-406 
ABA Ethics Committee 
The specific situation that the Committee considered was when one 
lawyer takes on the representation of another at a time when the two each 
have clients with adverse interests. 
The Committee said that "[w]hen one lawyer represents another, the 
ethical propriety of their representing persons whose interests are directly 
adverse depends upon the effect of such representation on each lawyer's 
ability to represent his 'third party' client in full compliance with the Model 
Rules." Opinion at 
1. 
The situation was governed by Rule 1.7(b). The 
critical question was whether the relationship between the two lawyers 
might materially limit the representation provided to either of their clients. 
The Committee said: 
One lawyer's duty.to, or interest in the work of the other lawyer may 
materially limit the lawyer's representation of his third- party client 
in 
any case in which the relationship between the lawyers might cause 
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either or both of them to temper advocacy on behalf of their opposing 
third-party clients. For example, a material limitation may exist if a 
representing lawyer is unwilling to seek sanctions against his 
opponent, who is also his client, because he is solicitous of the 
represented lawyer's reputation. Similarly, a material limitation may 
exist for a represented lawyer 
if 
she is unwilling to relay her third party 
client's demand to advance a transaction closing out of concern that to 
do so would distract her opponent -- who is also her lawyer --from 
working on the matter in which he represents her. 
Opinion at 2. 
The Committee said that a variety of considerations were relevant to 
the ethics question, including: 
1) 
the importance of the matter to the 
represented lawyer; 
2) 
the size of the expected fee; 3) the "sensitivity" of 
each matter; and 4) the nature of the relationship between the lawyers. 
The Committee also considered the extent to which this sort ofconflict 
of interest would be imputed to other lawyers in the firm. "It is 
a 
fundamental principle," said the Committee, "that the duties that one lawyer 
has to a client are shared by all lawyers in his firm." 
Id.
at 3. See Rule 
1.10, Rules of Professional Conduct.' The Committee concluded that the 
conflict, if there is one, could be imputed to other lawyers in the law firm, 
but the analysis was different for the representing lawyer than for the 
represented lawyer. 
The Committee said that if the representing lawyer is disqualified, 
under 1.7(b), from representing a third-party client adverse to the 
represented lawyer, then all other lawyers with whom the representing 
lawyer is associated are also disqualified. 
But the concept of imputed disqualification need not disqualify all 
lawyers associated with a representedlawyer. The Committee gave an 
example: 
[I]f lawyer D represents lawyer 
E 
in a purely personal matter --for 





it is hard to see why Rule 1.10 should be read to impute the 
disqualification that 
E
concludes that she personally has to all lawyers 
associated with 
E. 
No purpose generally thought to be served by Rule 
1.10 is served by such an application. Automatic imputation would 
either deter lawyers from seeking out, as their own counsel, lawyers 
whom they know best or may deem most qualified, or require that any 
lawyer having any personal legal matter register the name of the 
lawyer that represents him in his own firm's conflict data base, 
to 
Model Rule 1.10(a) states: "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall 
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited 
from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2." 
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assure that the possibility of disqualification, however remote, is 
considered in future conflicts checks. 
.... 
It is unreasonable to assume ...that all lawyers in the firm share the 
personal reservations that may lead one lawyer in the firm to conclude 
that she cannot be an effective advocate for a third party against 
a 
lawyer who also represents her. 
Id. at 4. 
The Committee acknowledged that its reading of the imputed 
disqualification rule went beyond the literal language ofRule 1.10, but said 
that it was working on a draft exception to the rule that was consistent with 
its views in this opinion. Opinion at footnote 11. 
H. Communicating with Persons Represented by Counsel - When 
the Government is Involved 
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 
A recent decision of the ABA Ethics Committee considers how the rule 
applies when the lawyer desires to communicate with a government official. 
Formal Opinion 97-408 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
The committee said that the no-contact rule "provide[s] protection of 
the represented person against overreaching by adverse counsel, 
safeguard[s] the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse 
counsel, and reduce[s] the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or 
other information that might harm their interests." Opinion at 2. The text 
of the rule does not identify the persons with whom contact is forbidden, 
but the committee said that the commentary "makes clear that the rule's 
protections extend to represented organizations as well as individuals." Id. 
But the commentary indicates that some communications with government 
representatives might be allowed because of the "authorized by law" 
exception in the text of the rule. The official comments to the rule state: 
"Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of 
a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with 
government officials about the matter." Id. 
The committee concluded that Rule 4.2 "is generally applicable to 
communications by lawyers with represented government entities." But it 
also said: "At the same time, we also agree that the no-contact rule must 
not be applied so as to frustrate a citizen's right to petition, exercised by 
direct communication with government decision makers, through a lawyer." 
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lawyer representing a private party in a controversy with the government to 
communicate directly with government decision makers in certain limited 
circumstances within the ambit of the right to petition, even though it would 
in the same circumstances prohibit communication with a represented 
private person or organization without consent ofcounsel." Id.at 3. 
However, the committee said that "the most responsible way" to 
accommodate the "tension between a citizen's right of access and the 
government's right to be protected from uncounselled communications" 
would be to make the lawyer contacts subject to two conditions. 
First, the government official to be contacted must have authority to 
take or recommend action in the controversy, and the sole purpose of 
the communication must be to address a policy issue, including settling 
the controversy. 
Second ... the Committee believes it essential to ensure that 
government officials will have an opportunity to be advised by counsel 
in making the decision whether to grant an interview with the lawyer 
for a private party seeking redress. Thus the lawyer for the private 
party must always give government counsel advance notice that it 
intends to communicate with officials of the agency to afford such 
officials an opportunity to discuss with government counsel the 
advisability of entertaining the communication. When the lawyer for 
the private party wishes to communicate in writing with government 
officials, the policy of fairness embodied in the rule also dictates that 
the lawyer must give government counsel copies of the written 
material at a time and in a fashion that will afford her a meaningful 
opportunity to advise the officials whether to receive the 
communication from the lawyer for the other side. 
Id. 
On the other hand, "[i]n situations where the right to petition the 
government has no applicability, either because it is not the sole purpose 
of 
the contact to address a policy issue or because the government officials 
with whom the lawyer wishes to communicate are not authorized to take or 
recommend action in the matter, Rule 4.2 should be considered fully 
applicable to a lawyer's communications with officials of a represented 
government entity, just as it would apply to lawyer's communications with 
officials of a private organization." Id. 
The committee pointed out that Rule 4.2 did not prohibit 
communications that had nothing to do with the representation. And 
it 
noted that "whistle blower" statutes, or other statutes, may authorize 
lawyers who represent clients to receive information from government 
officials without consent of government counsel. 
I. IOLTA 




Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 45 [1996], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol45/iss1/16
interest bearing accounts and require the interest to be forwarded to an 
organization that uses the funds to pay for indigent legal services and other 
purposes. The Louisiana IOLTA rules are set forth in Rule 1.15 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Questions have sometimes arisen about the constitutionality of 
mandatory IOLTA schemes. A recent decision of the United States Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Texas program is 
unconstitutional. 
Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas 
Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 
94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 2535 (U.S. 1997) 
In 1996, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
the constitutionality of the Texas IOLTA program. It held that the program 
amounted to an impermissible taking of interest, at least to the extent that 
clients whose money was deposited in IOLTA accounts did not assent to the 
state's use of the interest generated on those funds. The conventional 
wisdom in favor of these mandatory schemes is that no taking results 
because, in there were no IOLTA program, the deposits of client money 
would produce no interest in the first place. That is, absent IOLTA, 
attorneys would deposit client funds into non-interest bearing accounts. 
The Fifth Circuit rejected the conventional wisdom. It questioned the 
idea that IOLTA schemes "have unlocked the magic that eluded the 
alchemists." It saw the interest proceeds "not as the fruit ofalchemy, but as 
the fruit of the clients' principal deposits." The "traditional rule that interest 
follows principal must apply." 94 F.3d at 1004. 
Other courts that have considered the issue have upheld the validity 
of 
IOLTA schemes, on the theory that if there were no IOLTA program the 
deposits ofclient money would not produce any interest. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in June, 1997. 
J. E-Mail and Confidentiality 
Some ethics committees have begun to consider whether the lawyer's 
use of electronic mail may run afoul of the obligation of confidentiality that 
arises under Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The issue 
recently came before the North Dakota State Bar Association Ethics 
Committee. 
Opinion 97-09 
North Dakota State Bar Association Ethics Committee 
The committee said that the lawyer's duty under Rule 1.6 not to reveal 
information relating to the representation implies that a lawyer should have 
a 
reasonable expectation that the means of communication used will 
maintain confidentiality. It noted that some ethics opinions had concluded 
that a lawyer violates confidentiality obligations 
if 
the lawyer uses 
unencrypted e-mail without first discussing the risk of disclosure with the 
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client and obtaining client consent for the use. But it also noted that recent 
and "well-reasoned" opinions have concluded that a lawyer may 
communicate "routine" matters by using unencrypted e-mail without 
violating Rule 1.6. Further, the committee said that 
[i]n view of improvements in technology and changes in law, there 
now exists a reasonable certainty and expectation that unencrypted e-
mail may be regarded as confidential. Although interception of 
electronic messages is possible, it is no less difficult than intercepting 
an ordinary telephone call. 
The committee's opinion includes some discussion of Internet 
technology. It also refers to provisions of the United States Code making 
it 
illegal to intercept e-mail communications and providing that interception 
does not destroy the otherwise-privileged character of such 
communications. See 18 U.S.C. 2511 and 18 U.S.C. 2517(4). See also 
Opinion 97-5, Vermont Bar Association Committee on Professional 
Responsibility (lawyer does not violate confidentiality obligation by using 
e-mail to communicate with client). 
K. Web Sites and Lawyer Advertising 
A Utah ethics committee recently issued an opinion that discusses 
lawyer advertising on a web page. 
Opinion 97-10 
Utah State Bar, 
Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee 
October 24, 1997 
The committee said that "a potential client's access to information 
through a web site is analogous to telephoning the firm or visiting the 
lawyer's office to request information." Web site advertising should 
therefore comply with the rules against false and misleading advertising, 
retention of copies, inclusion of the name of a lawyer responsible for the 
advertising and the rule on listing fields ofpractice. 
On the retention of copies requirement, the committee said: 
[A]n attorney must retain 
a 
copy of each page of a web site, not just 
the "home page." Effective web sites are updated and changed 
regularly, perhaps even daily, and retaining 
a
hard copy ofeach update 
may not be efficient or practical. To satisfy Rule 7.2(b), attorneys may 




The committee was also of the view, however, that a simple listing of 
name, street address, electronic address, and facsimile number would not 
amount to "advertising," and would not require copy retention. 
The committee noted that "chat rooms" have become popular on 
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Internet sites. But it warned attorneys against using chat rooms for 
advertising and solicitation: 
The typical format involves simultaneous participation of several users 
in a real-time exchange or written messages at a common site that are 
displayed at each participant's computer terminal. Although these 
communications can often be reduced to written form, a chat-group 
communication is more analogous to an in-person conversation due to 
its direct, confrontational nature and the difficulty of monitoring and 
regulating it. We, therefore, find that an attorney's advertising and 
solicitation through a chat group are "in person" communications 
under Rule 7.3(a) and are accordingly restricted by the provisions of 
that rule. 
Opinion at 2. 
The Committee also looked into the applicability of the rules to e-mail 
communications. Unlike the chat-room discussions, e-mail transmissions 
are not "live." They are like written advertisements that can be ignored. On 
the other hand, the committee thought that the speed and mode of e-mail 
communications can have a "different impact" than a written advertisement. 
In some instances, that impact might translate into prohibited "coercion, 
duress, or harassment." Id. 
The committee also mentioned an unauthorized practice of law issue. 
A web site advertisement might induce someone from another jurisdiction 
to ask for legal help. The committee indicated that 
if 
the lawyer provides 
legal advice to such a person, the lawyer might run afoul of the prohibitions 
against unauthorized practice. 
On a related note, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently imposed 
a 
one-year suspension on an attorney for a massive e-mail advertising 
campaign. The attorney, Canter, posted an immigration law advertisement 
to thousands of Internet groups and lists. The lawyer did not include 
a 
mandatory disclaimer ("This is an advertisement") in the ad. He did not 
supply regulatory authorities with a copy of it. A hearing committee had 
found that the e-mail campaign had intruded on recipients' privacy rights 
and had forced recipients to pay for unwanted advertising. See News and 
Background, 13 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual ofProfessional Conduct 
13 
(July 23, 1997). 
L. Non-Lawyer Employees and Imputed Disqualification 
Lawyers are generally aware that "migratory lawyers" may bring 
conflicts of interest with them when they move to a new law firm. In some 
instances, those conflicts will be imputed to all of the members of the new 
law firm. Thus, Rule 1.10(b) states: 
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not 
knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was 
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associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are 
materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had 
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 [confidentially rule] and 
1.9(b) [former client rule] that is material to the matter. 
What about "migratory secretaries"? In the following case, the Nevada 
Supreme Court concludes that disqualification of a law firm may result 
from the migration of a secretary. 
Ciaffone v. Eighth Judicial District Court 
945 P.2d 950 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam) 
Members of the Ciaffone family sued the Skyline Restaurant over the 
shooting death of Joseph Ciaffone. The Gillock firm represented the 
Ciaffones. The Thorndal firm represented the restaurant. 
While the litigation was going on, Ingrid Decker was employed by the 
Thorndal firm as a "temp" in the word processing unit. A few weeks after 
starting work in word processing, Decker was hired directly by the firm to 
be a secretary to Clark, a lawyer at the firm. 
Clark did not work on the Ciaffone litigation, but Decker was assigned 
to do some limited "overflow" work on the case while she worked for 
Clark. Clark eventually left the firm. After he did so, Decker "floated" for 
awhile, at one time working for a few days for Marshall, the attorney 
of 
record in the Ciaffone case. 
A 
few months after Clark left the Thorndal firm, Decker did also. She 
was employed to be a secretary at the Gillock firm, and she was assigned to 
be the secretary for the attorney of record in the Ciaffone case. Two months 
after Decker started work at the Gillock firm, the Thorndal firm moved to 
disqualify the Gillock firm from the litigation, based on Decker's 
involvement in the Ciaffone litigation. 
Decker denied that she had done any work on the Ciaffone case during 
the brief time she worked for Marshall, while she was "floating" at the 
Thorndal firm, but she admitted that she may have done some limited work 
on the case while she was 
a 
word processor. After Decker came to work at 
the Gillock firm, the new firm "made efforts to screen Decker from any 
involvement in the Ciaffone" case. 945 P.2d at 952. 
The trial court granted the motion to disqualify. The Nevada Supreme 
Court analyzed the case in light of the language of two "ethics" rules, SCR 
160(2) and SCR 187, which are equivalent to Louisiana Rules 1.10(b) 
(quoted above) and 5.3 (which deals with "Responsibilities Regarding 
Nonlawyer Assistants"). The latter rule is the one that requires supervising 
lawyers to take "reasonable efforts" to ensure that the conduct ofnonlawyer 
personnel "is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer." 
And the court concluded: 
When SCR 187 is read in conjunction with SCR 160(2), nonlawyer 
employees become subject to the same rules governing imputed 
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disqualification. To hold otherwise would grant less protection to the 
confidential and privileged information obtained by a nonlawyer than 
that obtained by a lawyer. . . . [W]e conclude that the policy of 
protecting the attorney-client privilege must be preserved through 
imputed disqualification when a nonlawyer employee, in possession of 
privileged information, accepts employment with a firm who 
represents a client with materially adverse interests. 
945 P.2d at 953. 
The court declined to issue a writ of mandamus to the trial court to 
reinstate the disqualified firm. 
IV. Orders of the Louisiana Supreme Court 
A. CLE 
Louisiana lawyers are now required to add another subject to their 
annual CLE quota: professionalism. By order dated May 23, 1997, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court amended Rule 3(c) of the Rules for Continuing 
Legal Education to read as follows: 
(c) Of the fifteen (15) hours of CLE required annually, not less than 
one (1) ofsuch hours shall concern legal ethics, and not less than one 
(1) of such hours shall concern professionalism. 
Order of May 23, 1997. 
What is the difference between legal ethics and professionalism? 
Amended Rule 3(c) also states: 
Legal ethics concerns the standard of professional conduct and 
responsibility required ofa lawyer. It includes courses on professional 
responsibility and malpractice. It does not include such topics as 
attorneys' fees, client development, law office economics, and practice 
systems, except to the extent that professional responsibility 
is 
discussed in connection with these topics. 
Professionalism concerns the knowledge and skill of the law faithfully 
employed in the service of client and public good, and entails what 
is 
more broadly expected of attorneys. It includes courses on the duties 
of attorneys to the 
judicial 
system, courts, public, clients, and other 
attorneys; attorney competency; and pro bono obligations. 
Order of May 23, 1997. 
The distinction is also discussed in an amendment to Regulation 4.1(b): 
Topics eligible for CLE credit in satisfaction of the Professionalism 
requirement include the 
lawyer's 
responsibility as an officer of the 
court; the lawyer's responsibility to treat fellow lawyers, members of 
the bench, and clients with respect and dignity; misuse and abuse of 
discovery and litigation; the lawyer's responsibility to protect the 
image of the profession; the 
lawyer's 
responsibility generally to the 
public service; the lawyer's duty to be informed about methods of 
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dispute resolution and to counsel clients accordingly. 
Order of May 23, 1997. 
The change became effective on January 1, 1998. 
B. Subpoenas of Lawyers by Prosecutors 
In December of 1996, the Department of Justice filed a lawsuit 
challenging Rule 3.8(f) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The rule limited the ability ofa prosecutor to "subpoena a lawyer in a grand 
jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present 
client unless ...[among other things] ..."the prosecutor obtains prior judicial 
approval after an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding." 
Federal rules were less restrictive with respect to attorney subpoenas. 
The Department ofJustice contended that the Louisiana rule was preempted 
by federal law that regulates subpoenas, grand jury secrecy, and the 
attorney-client privilege. The DOJ lawsuit sought a declaration that the rule 
was null and void as to federal prosecutors, and an injunction barring the 
named defendants from enforcing it. The named defendants were the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, the Louisiana State Bar Association, the 
disciplinary board, and the disciplinary counsel. U.S. v. Louisiana Supreme 
Court, No. 967-7580 (M.D. La., filed 12/23/96). See Justice Department 
Sues in La., State Rules Hinder Confidential Criminal Probes, Suit Says, 
New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 27, 1996, at A2 
On June 1,1997, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered an amendment 
to the rule that removed the requirement of prior judicial approval. The 
change was effective upon signing. See Order of June 11, 1997. After the 
order was entered, the parties to the lawsuit stipulated to a dismissal without 
prejudice. 
C. Power of Attorney 
On April 30, 1997, the Supreme Court ordered an amendment to Rule 
1.8 ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct, effective June 
1,
1997. The order 
adds 
a 
new subpart (k) to the Rule, as follows: 
(k) A lawyer shall not solicit or obtain a power of attorney or mandate 
from a client which would authorize the attorney, without first 
obtaining the client's informed consent to settle, to enter into a binding 
settlement agreement on the client's behalf or to execute on behalf 
of 
the client any settlement or release documents. An attorney may 
obtain 
a 
client's authorization to endorse and negotiate an instrument 
given in settlement of the client's claim, but only after the client has 
approved the settlement. 
D. Disciplinary Enforcement 
On September 25, 1997, October 
9, 
1997, and on November 10, 1997, 
the Supreme Court ordered some amendments to the Rules for Lawyer 
Disciplinary Enforcement. As a result of the changes, the Rules now 
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include a new section 19B on "Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm." 
The new section provides, in part: 
A. ...Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a lawyer 
subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this court has committed 
a violation of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct or is under a disability 
as herein defined and poses a substantial threat ofserious harm to the 
public, disciplinary counsel shall: 
(i) 




Upon examination of the evidence transmitted to the court by 
disciplinary counsel and ofrebuttal evidence, if any, which the lawyer 
has transmitted to the court prior to the court's ruling, the court may 
enter an order immediately suspending the lawyer, pending final 
disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the conduct 
causing the harm; may order the lawyer to show cause, before 
a 
hearing committee panel appointed by the board, why the court should 
not issue an immediate interim suspension; or may order such other 
action as it deems appropriate. 
The amendments became effective on October 
1, 
1997, and November 
10, 1997. 
V. Louisiana Legislation 
A. Structured Settlements 
Recent legislation limits the liability of attorneys in recommending or 
negotiating structured settlements. RS 
3
7:222, which was approved on July 
3, 1997, provides, in part: 
An attorney who acts in good faith shall not be liable for any loss 
or damages as a result of any act or omission in negotiating 
or recommending a structured settlement of a claim or the particular 
mechanism or entity for the funding thereof or in depositing 
or 
investing settlement funds in a particular entity, unless the loss 
or damage was caused by his willful or wanton misconduct. 
The statute also provides that good faith is "presumed to exist" when 
the attorney negotiates with or invests in an entity that is "funded, 
guaranteed, or bonded by an insurance company" with a "minimum rating 
of "A+9" "Double A", or the equivalent. 
B. Law Firms and Title Insurance 
R.S. 12:804 was recently amended to provide as follows: 
A professional law corporation shall engage in no business other than 
the practice of law, but may hold property for investment or in 
connection with its legal practice. A professional law corporation may 
hold a title insurance agency license and serve as a title insurance 
agent in accordance with Title 22 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 
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1950. 
And R.S. 22:1113(BO(4) was enacted to provide: 
Any professional law corporation formed pursuant to R.S. 12:801 et 
seq. or any limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or 
partnership formed for the practice of law, as authorized by R.S. 
37:213, may be licensed as a title insurance agent or title insurance 
agency. 
The changes were approved on July 
3, 
1997. 
VI. Selected Louisiana Cases 
A. Attorney Misconduct 
Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct...; 
(b) Commit a criminal act especially one that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects; 
(c) 
Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation. 
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 
of 
justice. 
Several recent cases illustrate how misconduct can arise. 
1. 
Faked Automobile Accident 
In re Caulfield 
683 So. 2d 714 (La. 1996) 
Caulfield, an attorney, and Miller, a former police department 
employee, were alleged to have staged a fake automobile accident in New 
Orleans for the purpose of defrauding the Hertz Corporation and its insurer. 
A rental car operated by Miller collided with the rear end of a car 
owned and operated by Caulfield. Miller told the investigating police 
officer that he had been driving fast because he was anxious to reach his 
girlfriend's house, and that he had been blinded by sunlight immediately 
before the collision. After the accident, Caulfield filed a personal injury 
lawsuit against Miller, Hertz, and Hertz's insurer. He complained ofneck 
pain caused by the accident. 
When Hertz inspected the vehicles after the "accident," it began to 
suspect that the thing had been staged. Evidence at a resulting RICO trial 
showed that Caulfield and Miller had been acquainted with each other prior 
to the accident. It showed that Miller was a person of limited financial 
resources, who could not afford insurance for his own car; however, just 
before the accident, Miller had rented a car from Hertz at a cost of$141.27, 
allegedly because his own car was not running well, and Miller also 
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obtained $1million in liability insurance from Hertz in connection with the 
rental. There was evidence that Miller had been employed as a "runner" at 
Caulfield's law firm prior to the time of the accident. A jury in the civil 
RICO trial returned a verdict against Caulfield and Miller in the amount of 
$410,528.88. 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel charged Caulfield with staging 
a 
fake automobile accident, and it introduced the entire record of the civil 
RICO trial into the disciplinary proceedings. After reviewing the record, 
and after taking additional testimony, the Hearing Committee recommended 
that Caulfield be disbarred. 
Before the Supreme Court, Caulfield contended that the disciplinary 
authorities had given too much weight to the record in the RICO trial and 
that, in any event, there was no clear and convincing evidence that he had 
staged an automobile accident. 
The Supreme Court found that the disciplinary authorities had properly 
applied the clear and convincing standard of evidence. And it concluded 
that there was "more than ample evidence 
...
under the clear and convincing 
standard, that [Caulfield] staged an automobile accident." 683 So. 2d at 
717. 
On the question of sanctions, the Court said: 
The act of staging a fake automobile accident in order to collect money 
violates the ethical duty Respondent owes to the public, the legal 
system, and the legal profession. This court has previously imposed 
the sanction of disbarment upon attorneys who stage automobile 
accidents.... 
... [W]e agree with the Hearing Committee and Disciplinary Board 
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. 
Id. at 719. 
2. Negligent Homicide 
In re Brown 
674 So. 2d 243 (La. 1996) 
Attorney Brown was convicted ofnegligent homicide in the death of 
Gills, with whom she had lived for four years. Following an argument with 
Gills at their residence, Brown picked up a gun from beneath her bed. It 
"went off," wounding Gills in the chest. She died a short time later. 
Brown's criminal conviction was the basis of a subsequent charge that she 
had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In considering the case, the Louisiana Supreme Court said that 
conviction of a crime may warrant discipline, "even though the crime was 
not directly connected with the practice of law." 674 So. 2d at 246. It also 
said the following about the purpose of lawyer discipline: 
The purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to 
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punish the lawyer but rather to maintain appropriate standards of 
professional conduct to safeguard the public, to preserve the integrity 
of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in 
violations of the standards of the profession. 
Id.
at 245. 
Decisions from other jurisdictions indicated that suspension was 
an appropriate sanction for negligent homicide or vehicular homicide. 
However, the court noted that a "gun, unlike an automobile, is an inherently 
dangerous weapon." 674 So. 2d at 245. In this case, said the court, "the 
gun, an inanimate object, did not kill Brenda Gillis. Brenda Brown killed 
Brenda Gillis. The gun required human volition and Brenda Brown's overt 
action to kill." 
Id. 
at 249. The court concluded that disbarment was the 
appropriate sanction: 
The gravity of the crime reflects heavily on respondent's fitness to 
practice law. We cannot overlook the fact that respondent's actions 
resulted in the senseless destruction ofa life and will obviously forever 
change the lives of the victim's family, particularly, the victim's minor 
children. The actual resulting injury could not have been more severe. 
Moreover, respondent demonstrated a violent reaction to an 
admittedly non-threatening situation. Her response to this apparently 
stressful situation creates concern regarding her continued ability to 
represent clients given the pressures associated with the practice of 
law. The sanction imposed must, ofnecessity, reasonably correspond 
with the gravity of the misconduct. Accordingly, under the 
circumstances of this particular case, we conclude that respondent's 
conviction of negligent homicide warrants disbarment. 
Id. 
Cf., In reBowman, 679 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1996) (Attorney suspended 
from practice after being convicted of "driving under the influence 
--
resulting in death"). 
3. Phony Medical Records 
In re Castro 
699 So. 2d 382 (La. 1997) 
Castro was charged with four counts of insurance fraud for altering 
and forging four medical records of a physical therapist. He did this to 
induce insurers to pay larger settlements in personal injury cases. The total 
financial injury to the insurance companies was $1,800. 
Castro pleaded not guilty, and blamed the forged records on "an 
apparently non-existent paralegal." During plea negotiations, Castro 
admitted that he had fabricated the story about the paralegal. 
After receiving his criminal sentence 
(3 
years, suspended, with 
probation, community service, and restitution requirements), Castro was 
charged by disciplinary counsel with misconduct. The Supreme Court 
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ordered disbarment. It said: 
We agree ... that the crime of which respondent was convicted is one 
that strikes directly a[t] public trust in the profession. This court has 
disbarred attorneys for similar conduct. 
. . . 
Several aggravating 
factors exist in this case: dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of 
misconduct, multiple offenses, and submission of false statements 
during the disciplinary process. While we recognize that respondent is 
not experienced in the practice of law, this lack of experience 
is actually an aggravating circumstance under the facts of this case. 
Respondent began his dishonest conduct almost immediately upon 
commencing practice and was "caught in the act" in his first five 
months of practice. His brief time in practice leaves him totally 
without any time in practice to point to as an example of honest 
conduct. Further, although respondent now shows some remorse for 
his actions, we note that for more than a year, respondent failed to take 
responsibility for his actions and attempted to blame them on 
a 
fictitious paralegal. 
699 So. 2d 384. 
4. Nonpayment of Taxes 
In re Mitchell 
681 So. 2d 339 (La. 1996) 
Attorney Mitchell pleaded guilty to failure to file income tax returns. 
He was fined $1000 and placed on criminal probation for one year. After 
the criminal sanction came down, disciplinary proceedings were initiated, 
on the theory that the criminal conviction amounted to misconduct under 
Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court ordered that Mitchell be suspended from the practice of law for a year 
and a day, but it deferred the suspension, and placed Mitchell on a two year 
probation, during which he was ordered to satisfy a number of requirements 
imposed by the court. See also In re Shealy, 700 So. 2d 488 (La. 1997) 
(One-year suspension, all but six months deferred, and probation, for failure 
to file income tax return); In re Thomas, 700 So. 2d 490 (15 month 
suspension, all but nine months deferred, and two years of probation, for 
failure to file income tax return); In re Stout, 694 So. 2d 908 (La. 1997) 
(18 
month suspension, with six months deferred, for failing to file tax returns 
for 8 years); In reHuckaby, 694 So. 2d 906 (La. 1997) (per curiam) (One 
year suspension, with six months deferred, for failure to file a 1987 tax 
return; the fact that the attorney had been a district 
judge 
required that he be 
held to a higher than usual standard; he had previously been removed from 
office after pleading guilty to a criminal charge based on the failure to file 
the tax return). 
B. Contingent Fees 
Rule 1.5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct states, in part: 
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A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage 
or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of 
settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted 
from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted 
before or after the contingent fee is calculated. 
1. 
Oral Contingent Fees 
An oral contingent fee agreement violates the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. It can also cause other problems. 
Tschirn v. Secor Bank 
691 So. 2d 1290 (La. Ct. App. 1997), 
writ denied, 701 So. 2d 172 (La. 1997) 
Tschirn, an attorney, asked Kohnke, a lawyer at Lemle 
&
Kelleher, to 
represent him in 
a 
lawsuit against Secor Bank. Kohnke agreed to undertake 
the representation. 
A
couple ofyears later, Kohnke and some other lawyers 
left the Lemle firm and established the Frilot firm. Tschim decided to have 
Kohnke continue to represent him in the litigation with Secor. 
There had been discussions between Kohnke and Tschirn about fees, 
but no fee agreement was ever reduced to writing. The partners of the 
Lemle firm and the departing partners who formed the Frilot firm entered 
into a Separation Agreement that set forth the terms of the withdrawal from 
the Lemle partnership. There was a notation in the agreement that Kohnke 
had agreed to an oral contingency contract with Tschirn in the Secor Bank 
case of 1/3 of the recovery plus reimbursement of costs. 
A 
subsequent fee 
sharing agreement stated that any recovery obtained was to be split evenly 
between the two firms. Tschirn acknowledged the terms of the agreement 
as well. 
Following the conclusion of trial in the Secor Bank case, the jury 
returned with a verdict of $1.2 million in favor of Tschirn. Defendants 
issued a draft in the amount of $1.2 million payable to Tschirn, the Frilot 
firm and the Lemle firm. 
A 
dispute then arose over the amount of the 
contingent fee. Lemle contended that the fee was to be calculated on the 
gross recovery plus reimbursement of expenses incurred by the firm. 
Tschirn, Kohnke and Frilot contended that the fee was to be calculated on 
the amount of the net recovery after deduction ofexpenses that Tschirn had 
paid during the proceedings. The difference between these two calculations 
was $10,628.07. The disputed funds were held in escrow. 
After a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor ofLemle 
on 
the amount in dispute. Then the issue came before the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeal. It reversed. 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Fee Sharing Agreement did not 
specifically state that the contingent fee would be calculated on the "gross 
recovery." In any event, that agreement was not a contingency fee contract. 
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But there was testimony from Kohnke and Tschim that they had agreed that 
Tschirn would pay the costs of the litigation and that those costs would be 
deducted from the recovery before the contingent fee would be calculated. 
The court then stated: 
[W]e find that Rule 1.5 requires that a contingency fee agreement be in 
writing and must specify if the expenses are to be deducted before 
or after the fee is calculated. However, if the attorney and client enter 
into a binding oral contingency fee agreement, we hold that any 
ambiguity in the agreement shall be construed against the attorney 
in 
favor of the client. 
691 So. 2d at 1294. 
Lemle lost this battle, but still was paid $189,371.93, plus costs. 
2. Meeting of the Minds 
Even when a contingent fee agreement is reduced to writing, questions 
can still arise about the enforceability of the agreement. 
Buruzs v. Buruzs 
686 So. 2d 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1996) 
Buruzs, an appliance repairman, took his son with him on a service 
call. While his son, age 4, was waiting in the van, the van caught on fire 
and the child died. 
Buruzs consulted with attorney Dunn, and signed a contingency fee 
contract. The agreement provided for a one-third of recovery fee 
if 
settlement were reached without filing suit and 40% 
if 
suit were filed. 
Dunn asked attorney Wimberly to work with him on the case. They 
sued the manufacturers ofa wheelchair lift, Buruzs' former spouse, and her 
insurer. A settlement for policy limits ($100,000) was reached with the 
insurer. However, Buruzs refused to sign the authorization to settle and 
sent Dunn a letter discharging Dunn as his lawyer. Buruzs apparently 
expressed an intention to settle the case on his own. Dunn thereafter 
intervened in the litigation, claiming that he was entitled to $40,000. 
The trial court found that Dunn had been discharged for cause. This 
resulted in a conclusion that Dunn was entitled to quantum meruit recovery 
instead of the percentage of the settlement amount set forth in the fee 
agreement. 
Buruzs claimed that he had not read the contingency fee agreement, 
had not been given a copy of it, and had not employed Dunn to file suit 
against his former wife and her insurer. He claimed that he had wanted to 
handle that claim on his own, and that he wanted Dunn to handle claims 
against the lift company and Ford Motor Corporation. 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court, but did not 
decide whether Dunn had been discharged for cause. It said: 
Because we conclude there existed no meeting of the minds between 
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the parties to the purported contingency contract, we hold that no 
agreement came into existence.... 
Having so concluded, no necessity exists to consider whether Dunn 
was discharged with or without cause. 
686 So. 2d at 1009. 
With respect to the amount owing to Dunn, the court said: "Where 
there has been an enrichment in the absence ofa contract, the law implies a 
promise to pay a reasonable amount of compensation." Id. at 1009. Here, 
the trial court had concluded that Dunn's co-counsel had done "the 
overwhelming bulk of the work," and had awarded Dunn $1500. Id. The 
Fourth Circuit found no reason to disturb that result. 
The court listed several facts that supported the client's position in the 
litigation. They included: 
1) 
Buruzs was not furnished a copy of the initial contract, 
2) As soon as a contract was signed Dunn immediately asked Jesse 
Wimberly to handle the claim. 
3) 
Dunn, despite calls, did nothing to communicate with Buruzs. 
4) Dunn filed a petition without notifying Buruzs or allowing him 
to review or to verify the pleadings. 
Id. at 1008. 
C. Securing Payment of Fees 
Rule 1.8(j) of the Rules of Professional Conduct says, in part, that "[a] 
lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or 
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that 
the lawyer may ... [a]cquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee 
or expenses." 
In Saucierv. Hayes Dairy,373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979), the Louisiana 
Supreme Court took a look at R.S. 37:218, which allows an attorney to 
secure payment of a fee by entering into a contract with the client that 
provides for payment of the fee out ofthe proceeds of the litigation, and by 
filing the contract with the clerk of the court. One of the issues in the 
Sauciercase was whether the statute was inconsistent with the predecessor 
ofRule 1.8(j), which set forth the same limitation that is quoted above. The 
Supreme Court did not invalidate the statute, and construed it to provide for 
a "privilege granted to aid the attorney's collection of a fully earned fee." 
373 So. 2d at 117. 
R.S. 37:218 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In such contract, it may be stipulated that neither the attorney nor the 
client may, without the written consent of the other, settle, 
compromise, release, discontinue, or otherwise dispose of the suit 
or 
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with the clerk ofcourt in the parish in which the suit is pending or is to 
be brought or with the clerk of court in the parish of the client's 
domicile. After such filing, any settlement, compromise, 
discontinuance, or other disposition made of the suit or claim by either 
the attorney or the client, without the written consent of the other, is 
null and void and the suit or clam shall be proceeded with as ifno such 
settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition had been 
made. 
A recent case shows how the statute can work. 
Martin v. David 
685 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App. 1996) 
writ denied, 682 So. 2d 766 (La. 1996) 
Martin, a hotel guest, was injured when a fire broke out at the Royal 
Motel of New Iberia on June 20, 1992. Martin hired the Shea firm to 
represent him in a suit against the Davids, who owned the hotel, and 
Scottsdale, the hotel's insurer. Suit was filed on December 25, 1992. 
Shortly after suit was filed, lawyer Calahan filed a petition to enroll as 
counsel of record for Martin. He also filed an amended petition dismissing 
the Davids from the suit and naming Royal Motel 
& 
Hotel, Inc. as a 
defendant. A week after these events, Martin executed an agreement with 
Shea purporting to entitle Shea to 1/3 of any recovery Martin would obtain 
in the personal injury action. Shea also moved to rescind Calahan's 
enrollment. The trial court concluded that Calahan could prosecute the 
litigation, observing the at the conflict between law firms had been caused 
by Martin. On December 
3, 
1992 Martin settled the case, executing a 
receipt and release agreement with Scottsdale and its corporate owner. 
Martin received $150,000, 1/3 of which was distributed to Calahan as fees 
under the fee agreement between Martin and Calahan. 
On December 4 Shea intervened, claiming legal subrogation to 
Martin's rights against defendants for fees in the amount of 1/3 of any 
recovery. Martin, Calahan, and Scottsdale were all named defendants in the 
intervention. 
After other procedural developments had occurred, a hearing was held 
on Shea's intervention petition. In May 1995, the trial court awarded Shea 
$25,000 in legal fees, plus interest. All defendants were found solidarily 
liable. Scottsdale, which had already paid out the settlement money, 
appealed from this order. 
The focus was on RS 37:218. Scottsdale contended that the statute 
permits an attorney to obtain a lien against the proceeds of settlement. 
Since the settlement proceeds had already been disbursed, Scottsdale 
claimed that it had been absolved of personal liability. The court disagreed. 
It said: 
The obvious intent of La. R.S. 37:218 is to prevent a client's 
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discharging an attorney and thereby depriving the attorney of his 
earned fee. Therefore, if the attorney with a written contingency fee 
contract bearing the no consent stipulation 'file(s) and records it with 
the clerk ofcourt in the parish in which the suit is pending ...', then a 
defendant who disburses the settlement proceeds without ascertaining 
and paying the fee to which the attorney is due, will do so to his 
prejudice. 
685 So. 2d at 162 (quoting from Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 
66, 70 (La. 1979). 
Scottsdale raised other issues about the propriety ofsolidary liability in 
this situation, but the court found them to be unpersuasive. Returning 
to R.S. 37:218, the court said: 
Because the settlement and dismissal to which Scottsdale was a party 
failed to take into account Shea's duly recorded fee agreement, they 
are null and void, at least as to Shea's claim for legal services 
rendered. When Scottsdale disbursed the settlement proceeds without 
ascertaining and paying Shea the fee to which he was due, the insurer 
did so at its own prejudice. 
Id.
at 163. 
The court said that Scottsdale could have avoided the problem by 
following its usual practice of issuing the settlement check to the claimant 
and to both attorneys. 
D. Tort Damages for Ethical Violations 
Unethical conduct can result in formal disciplinary proceedings. 
It 




674 So. 2d 272 (La. Ct. App. 1996) 
Boydell and Du Barry represented Ratcliff in a wrongful death action 
after her husband had been killed in an automobile accident. Ratcliff signed 
a contingency fee agreement that provided for a fee of 1/3 of the recovery 
if 
the case settled before suit were filed and 40% 
if 
suit were filed. Suit was 
eventually filed in 1984. In 1985, during the jury selection phase of the 
trial, the case was settled for a lump sum of $225,000 plus a structured 
settlement. Ratcliff elected an annuity plan calling for monthly payments 
of 
$1000 for the life ofher son, starting on January 
1,
2002, and for lump sum 
payments of $25,000 in 2006, $40,000 in 2011, $60,000 in 2016, $90,000 
in 2021, $130,000 in 2026, $200,000 in 2031, and $300,000 in 2036. 
After delivery of the settlement documents, Ratcliff and Boydell met to 
conclude the matter. 
A
dispute arose over the amount of the fee: 
Boydell deducted from the $225,000.00 his forty percent or 
$90,000.00 and costs of $17,217.50. He also withheld $45,000.00 
which was forty percent of $112,000.00 which Boydell considered to 
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be the present value of the annuity. Plaintiff questioned the amount of 
the fee on the annuity and Boydell accused her of not trusting him. 
She became emotional and left with the check for $72,782.50 which 
she cashed. 
674 So. 2d at 275. 
Shortly thereafter, Ratcliff consulted with a new attorney, Barrios, 
about her concerns. She then wrote a letter to Boydell questioning his view 
of the present value of the annuity, and stating that she believed the present 
value to be between $45,000 and $70,000. Boydell's written response 
indicated that he was "very disappointed" to receive her letter, and that the 
estimate "of present day value was based on information from both 
attorneys and accountants, all ofwhom were quite familiar with structured 
settlements." Moreover, the estimate "was as accurate as one can get, and 
you willingly accepted it." 
Id.
at 276. 
Ratcliffultimately sued over the fee dispute, and the case went to trial. 
The trial court rendered judgment against her original attorneys for 
$98,214.00, consisting of $25,214.00 for a refund of fees, $43,000.00 for 
abuse ofprocess, $12,000.00 for unethical practices, fraud and conversion, 
and $18,000.00 for intentional infliction of emotional distress. After further 
proceedings, the trial court also awarded substantial attorneys' fees to 
Ratcliff. The case was appealed. 
The Fourth Circuit's opinion described what had gone wrong in the fee 
calculation: 
When Boydell left [the settlement] conference, he knew he was under 
an obligation to determine the cost or value of that settlement in order 
to compute the correct fee due him under his contract with plaintiff. 
This information was readily available, but only from an actuary, 
an 
economist, or perhaps a broker who sells structured settlements. 
A certified public accountant without these additional specialties would 
not be able to provide this information. Boydell knew this, but instead 
of contacting someone who could provide him with the value he called 
his own CPA and compounded his dereliction by posing a loaded 
question to him. Boydell had concluded in his own mind that the 
value of the $724,000.00 annuity was $112,000.00. He asked the CPA 
to determine an interest rate which could somehow justify this figure. 
Id. at 277. 
Boydell's own version of events differed, but the trial court had not 
believed him. After Ratcliff filed her suit, Boydell and Du Barry filed sixty 
motions and exceptions and took six devolutive appeals. The Fourth Circuit 
said that "[v]irtually none of these maneuvers was meritorious." 
Id.
at 279. 
They also filed suit against Ratcliff for incidental services, defamation and 
malicious prosecution. They filed suit against Ratcliff's new attorney for 
defamation and malicious prosecution. 
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On appeal the Fourth Circuit rejected Boydell's argument that 
claims of damage from fraud, unethical practice, conversion, abuse of 
process and emotional distress were not cognizable because they 
involve the behavior of a lawyer. He contends that Art. V §(50(B) of 
the Constitution confers jurisdiction over such behavior in the 
Supreme Court. This argument is specious. The Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer but 
a 
litigant who suffers damages as a result ofa lawyer's misconduct has 
a perfect right to seek redress in court. 
Id.
at 279. 
Boydell also argued that "there is no legal authority for a court to 
award tort damages to a former client for ethical violations." Id. at 280. 
The court responded: 
This overlooks the very basis for tort liability which is the duty-risk 
concept. When a lawyer commits a breach of duty imposed by the 
ethical rules and that breach is a cause in fact of his client's damage, 
she has a right to recover in tort. The fact that the Supreme Court 
might also take disciplinary action against him hardly deprives her of 
her tort remedy. 
Id. 
Near the end of its opinion, the court said that the defendants "turned 
this simple claim for a $25,000.00 refund into a procedural morass and 
marathon for the purpose of intimidating and punishing plaintiff for daring 
to sue them." 
Id.
at 282. 
E. Sex With Clients 
Ethical problems can arise when an attorney establishes an intimate 
sexual relationship with 
a 
client. In Formal Opinion 92-364 (1992), the 
ABA Ethics Committee observed that such a relationship involved 
a "danger of impairment to the lawyer's representation" and that 
if 
the 
"impairment is not avoided, the lawyer will have violated ethical 
obligations to the client." California has adopted a rule that directly 
addresses the impropriety ofsome attorney-client sexual relationships. See 
Rule 3-120, California Rules of Professional Conduct. Although the 
Louisiana rules do not expressly prohibit sexual relationships between 
attorneys and clients, this does not mean that such relationships are a good 
idea. 
Sanders v. Gore 
676 So. 2d 866 (La. Ct. App. 1996), 
writ denied, 682 So. 2d 762 (La. 1996) 
Sanders contacted attorney Gore about a collection matter. Although 
both Sanders and Gore were married to others at the time, they began an 
intimate sexual relationship that continued for over three years. Gore 
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eventually convinced Sanders that he wanted to divorce his wife and marry 
her. He also convinced her to leave her husband, and represented her in 
obtaining a divorce. After Sanders' divorce, Gore formally asked Sanders 
to marry him. She agreed. But later Gore broke off the relationship, telling 
Sanders he was "too weak" to leave his wife. 
Sanders sued for damages. Her petition explicitly detailed various 
events that had occurred in their relationship, recounted numerous 
"indiscretions," and made disparaging remarks about Gore's marriage, 
which had survived the affair. 
The court rejected Sanders' claim of damages based on breach of 
a 
promise to marry, on the ground that contracts in derogation of marriage are 
against public policy. 
But Sanders also alleged an abuse of the attorney/client relationship. 
Although the court rejected the claim, its language indicates that conduct of 
the sort in question might give rise to both ethical violations and 
recoverable damages: 
Although this court finds Mr. Gore's actions ethically reprehensible, 
Louisiana law does not prohibit sexual relationships between attorneys 
and their clients. Also, although Ms. Sanders alleges a conflict of 
interest in his handling of her divorce, she does not allege that Mr. 
Gore failed to adequately represent her. Nor is it alleged that Ms. 
Sanders was unaware of this conflict of interest. In fact, Ms. Sanders 
specifically alleges in her petition that Mr. Gore told her the reason he 
wanted her to file for divorce was so that he could marry her. 
Furthermore, Ms. Sanders does not allege that Mr. Gore's handling of 
her legal affairs caused her any injury that was independent of her 
claim for breach of the promise to marry. 
676 So. 2d at 872-873. 
The courts seem to have concluded that there was at least a conflict of 
interest involved in the divorce representation. But this was not 
a 
disciplinary case; it was a case in which the client sought damages from the 
attorney for breach of his obligations to her. If she had been able to show 
injury "independent" of the breach ofpromise to marry claim, the outcome 
might have been different. 
There was another problem with attorney conduct in this case. The 
trial court was displeased with the "scandalous" statements contained 
in 
Sanders' petition, particularly the "unnecessary comments about Mr. Gore's 
family and his sexual relationship with his wife." Id. at 874. The court 
ordered Sanders' attorney to pay sanctions in the amount of $1000 and to 
write a letter of apology to Gore's wife. Sanders, but not her attorney, 
sought to appeal the sanction. The Third Circuit rejected her claim on 
appeal, on the ground that Sanders had no interest in the sanctions imposed 
on her lawyer. But "assuming arguendo that the issue of sanctions was 
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properly before this court on appeal, we find that the trial court was well 
within its authority in levying sanctions based on the egregious language of 
the petition filed by [Sanders' attorney], a petition which states no cause of 
action." 
Id.
at 875. The court referenced Articles 863 and 864 of the Code 
ofCivil Procedure. 
F. Restrictions on the Right to Practice Law 
Rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states: 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: 
(a) A partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of 
a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except 
an 
agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or 
(b) 
An agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to 
practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private 
parties. 
Lawyer employment agreements frequently contain financial 
provisions relating to the departure of the lawyer. Can those provisions 
violate the rule? 
Warner v. Carimi Law Firm 
678 So. 2d 561 (La. Ct. App. 1996) 
Warner was employed on a contract basis by the Carimi firm. He 
worked for the firm for five years until Carimi changed the door locks and 
refused to allow Warner access to his office. Carimi locked Warner out 
because Carimi believed that Warner was planning to leave the firm and 
take files that belonged to the firm. Warner thereafter set up his own 
practice, handling cases of clients he took with him from the Carimi firm. 
Carimi refused to pay Warner wages and fees allegedly due under their 
employment agreement. Indeed, Carimi demanded that Warner repay 
monies Carimi had advanced to on or behalf offormer clients of the firm, 
in 
accordance with an employment agreement between Carimi and Warner. 
Litigation ensued over these, and other claims. 
The employment agreement contained a number ofprovisions dealing 
with termination. Among other things, it provided that 
if 
Warner "takes 
over any client 
... 
the out-of-pocket money advanced to or on behalf of the 
client by CLF [the Carimi firm] shall be reimbursed to CLF in full within 
ten (10) days." It provided that Warner "shall personally take over any 
guarantee of payment CLF has extended on behalf of client." It further 
provided that Warner's failure to reimburse the firm within the 10 day 
period would result in Warner owing the firm "liquidated damages for this 
failure equal to 25% of the owed monies" plus interest. 678 So. 2d at 563. 
Finally, the agreement provided that 
if 
Warner failed to make the required 
payments, and 
if 
he were found, after suit was filed, "to owe any fee or out-
of-pocket money whatsoever," he would owe "in addition to those fees and 
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monies held by the Court to be owed to CLF, an additional sum equal to 
twenty (20%) percent of [the gross fees plus out-of-pocket money, plus 
liquidated damages and interest owed] as an attorney's fee." Id. 
Carimi claimed that Warner owed it all outstanding costs and advances 
on any files he had taken, plus liquidated damages and attorneys' fees as 
provided in the agreement. 
Several of Warner's clients (who were former Carimi clients) sought 
to intervene in the litigation, alleging that Carimi's financial demands on 
Warner made it impossible for him to handle their cases. These clients 
sought to annul the employment agreement on the basis that it 
"impermissibly interferes with their attorney-client relationship and directly 
inhibits their rights to free choice of legal counsel." Id. at 562. The trial 
court refused to allow the intervention; it also entered partial summary 
judgment in favor of Carimi in the amount of $211,702.01, plus liquidated 
damages, interest, and attorneys' fees. 
On appeal, Warner contended that the cost-reimbursement clause of 
the employment agreement violated Rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and was therefore void as against public policy. The Fifth Circuit 
disagreed. It distinguished the case from Minge 
v. 
Weeks, 629 So. 2d 545 
(Ct. App. 1993), where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found 
unenforceable an employment contract that required the attorney to give his 
former employer 80% ofthe fees generated by cases the attorney took with 
him when he left. The financial disincentives in that contract violated the 
"language and spirit of Rule 5.6." 678 So. 2d at 564 (citing Minge v. 
Weeks, 629 So. 2d at 547). The present case was different, said the Fifth 
Circuit: 
Unlike the arrangement in Minge v. Weeks, this agreement does not 
penalize the attorney who actually performs the work on the case by 
forcing him to pay most of his fee to the former attorney. Rather, 
it 
simply shifts the burden offinancing the case from the former attorney 
to the client's new attorney, which is where the burden should be. 
Id. at 565. 
Although the court rejected Warner's principal argument about Rule 
5.6, it did reverse the summary judgment order. It said that the amount 
of 
the attorney's fee to be awarded was an issue of fact. It also concluded that 
there were genuine fact issues about which clients he "took over," as well as 
the amounts due on their cases. 
G. Prescription of Malpractice Claims 
Louisiana has a short prescriptive/peremptive period for attorney 
malpractice claims. See La. Rev. Stat. 9:5605. Questions sometimes arise 
about when the period begins to run. In the following case, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court considered a claim that the statute did not begin to run 
against 
a 
lawyer who continued to represent the client after committing the 
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malpractice and who was working to rectify the results of the malpractice. 
Reeder v. North 
701 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1997) 
On July 10, 1989, Reeder, an investor in a fraudulent check kiting and 
Ponzi scheme, brought suit in federal court against the organizers of the 
scheme, claiming various violations of the securities laws. The federal case 
was dismissed with prejudice in 1990. Then, in May of 1990, Reeder 
brought an action in state court, asserting claims based on state securities 
laws. But this action was dismissed on April 26, 1991 on the basis of res 
judicata. Reeder appealed within the state court system, but eventually, on 
September 3, 1993, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 
dismissal with prejudice, holding that, under the doctrine of res judicata, the 
federal district court's final judgment barred all subsequent claims, state and 
federal. Reeder's application for writ ofcertiorari was denied by the United 
States Supreme Court on February 28, 1994. Thereafter, Reeder brought a 
malpractice action against his former attorney, alleging that the attorney had 
failed to assert all viable state causes of action in the original federal 
lawsuit. 
The defendants claimed that the malpractice action was time-barred. 
The malpractice action was brought on September 15, 1994. Defendants 
claimed this was more than three years after "the alleged act, omission or 
neglect occurred." The trial court agreed, and granted the exception. On 
appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Reeder argued that the "continuing 
representation rule" applied, and that the cause ofaction for malpractice did 
not accrue until the United States Supreme Court denied the application for 
writ of certiorari in February 1994. 
The Fifth Circuit reversed. It reasoned: 
In determining when the claim against an attorney comes into 
existence, and hence when prescription or peremption begins to run, 
we must determine when the facts ripened into a viable cause ofaction 
sufficient to support a lawsuit.... 
Throughout our jurisprudence, legal malpractice claims did not ripen 
until the attorney-client relationship was terminated. If a malpractice 
suit was filed against an attorney while he continued to represent the 
client on the same subject matter originally undertaken, the suit was 
premature.... 
... While there exists an ongoing, continuous and dependent 
relationship between the client and the attorney and the attorney 
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While the attorney-client relationship is in existence and the attorney 
is actively attempting to remedy the alleged malpractice until the 
judgment giving rise to the malpractice claim becomes definitive, a 
legal malpractice claim does not ripen into a cause of action. 
683 So. 2d at 915-916. 
Accordingly, the court ruled that the cause of action had not 
prescribed, because the malpractice action was filed within one year of the 
date the "judgment became definitive," and had not been "preempted since 
it is within three years of that date." Id. at 917. 
The Louisiana Supreme court reversed. It considered the language of 
R.S. 9:5605, and concluded that the legislature's intent was clear. In this 
case, the "act, omission, or neglect" that was the basis of the malpractice 
complaint was the attorney's failure to include the state law claims the 
federal complaint, which was filed on July 10, 1989. The court said: 
[T]he court of appeal was wrong in holding that the peremptive period 
did not begin to run until the "facts ripened into a viable cause of 
action sufficient to support a lawsuit," i.e., the date the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. Because the negligent act occurred before 
September 7, 1990, Reeder had until September 7, 1993 to file the 
malpractice action, "without regard to the date of the discovery of the 
alleged act, omission, or neglect." 
701 So. 2d at 1296. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the terms of the malpractice 
statute "may seem unfair" in "that a person's claim may be extinguished 
before he realizes the full extent ofhis damages." However, it also said that 
"the enactment of such a statute of limitations is exclusively a legislative 
prerogative." Id. at 1296. 
The Supreme Court also found error in the lower court's decision that 
the peremptive period of the statute was, in effect, suspended during the 
time when the attorney continued to represent Reeder in the state court 
proceedings. The court said that, "[a]s a suspension principle based on 
contra non valentem, the 'continuous representation rule' cannot apply to 
peremptive periods." "Peremption" observed the court, "differs from 
prescription." Id. at 1298. The court did, however, remand the case for 
consideration of a claim that R.S. 9:5605 was unconstitutional. 
H. Representing Yourself in Malpractice Litigation 
Lawyers are sometimes tempted to represent themselves when they are 
sued for malpractice. One of the issues that comes up is the applicability of 
Rule 3.7 of the Rules on Professional Conduct, dealing with the "lawyer as 
witness." The Rule provides, in part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer 
is 
likely to be a necessary witness except where: 
301 -
37
Smith: Legal Ethics - A Few Things You Should Know
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 1996
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value oflegal services 
rendered in the case; 
or 
(3) 
Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client. 
(b) 
A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in 
the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded 
from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
The applicability of Rule 3.7 in the lawyer malpractice context was 
directly considered in the following case. 
Farrington v. Law Firm of Sessions, Fishman 
687 So. 2d 997 (La., 1997) 
Deborah Farrington and Roger Cope were equal shareholders in 
a 
business that they had purchased. After the purchase, members of the 
Sessions law firm were asked to draft some documents and to assist with 
corporate matters relating to the business. 
A
dispute arose between the two 
shareholders, and, at the request of Cope, the Sessions firm filed suit on 
behalf of the corporation against Farrington. After settlement of that 
litigation, Farrington brought a malpractice action, claiming that members 
of the Sessions firm had failed to provide her with adequate advice 
in 
connection with the structure of the business and that they had been 
involved in a conflict of interest when they had sued her on behalf of the 
corporation. The defendants contended that they had never represented 
Farrington in an individual capacity. 
The defendants were represented by Ezkovich, a member of the 
Sessions law firm and a defendant in the malpractice lawsuit. When the 
defendants attempted to take Farrington's deposition, she filed a motion 
to 
stay the taking of the deposition until an attorney who was not a member of 
the Sessions firm was appointed to represent the defendants. She contended 
that the defendants had 
a 
conflict of interest in representing themselves, on 
account of their former attorney-client relationship with her, and that 
a protective order was needed to avoid the embarrassment and oppression that 
she would suffer 
if 
the attorneys were allowed "to proceed as advocates on 
their own behalf." Id. at 998. 
The main issue before the Supreme Court was "whether 
a 
lawyer who 
is sued by an alleged former client on grounds of malpractice has the right 
to conduct adversarial proceedings on his or her own behalf." 
Id.
at 999. 
The court answered this question in the affirmative. 
Initially, the court noted that the Louisiana Constitution guarantees 
every person the right of access to the courts,2 and that Louisiana courts 
2 La. Const. Art. 1, §22. 
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have recognized "the right of litigants in civil proceedings to represent 
themselves in court." 687 So. 2d at 999. The court acknowledged that 
Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct "prohibits a lawyer from 
acting as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be called as a 
necessary witness except under certain circumstances," but said that "Rule 
3.7 does not address the situation where the lawyer is representing himself." 
Id. 
The Court was persuaded, at least in part by what it called the 
"Comments to Rule 3.7." It cited an ABA-prepared annotation to Rule 
3.7 
(which is not actually one of the official comments to the model rule) for 
the proposition that the "rationales of the advocate-witness rule do not apply 
to the pro se lawyer-litigant." See Center for Professional Responsibility, 
American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
362 (3d ed. 1996). The court quoted the following from a Connecticut 
case: 
One reason is that it is unfair to the client that his case be presented 
through a witness whom the trier of fact would necessarily view as 
interested because of the witness' zeal ofadvocacy and likely interest 
in the result of the case. A second reason is one of public policy: 
permitting an attorney who is trying a case also to be a witness 
in 
establishing its facts will visit on the legal profession public distrust 
and suspicion arising from the attorney's dual role. That is the reason 
which Professor Wigmore believed to be the most potent reason for the 
prohibition of the attorney as a witness on behalf of his client. The 
public will be apt to think that the lawyer, whether he is an active 
partner in the conduct of the trial and also a material witness, or an 
inactive partner and a material witness, will be inclined to warp the 
truth in the interest of his client. The third reason for the rule is to 
avoid the appearance of wrongdoing. We do not believe that any of 
these reasons applies where the attorney seeks only to represent 
himself in his own case. 
Id. at 1000 (quoting from Presnick v. Esposito, 513 A.2d 165, 167 
(Conn. Ct. App. 1986). 
The court also cited a Massachusetts case for the following line of 
reasoning: 
Any perception by the public or determination by a jury that a lawyer 
litigant has twisted the truth surely would be due to his role as litigant 
and not, we would hope, to his occupation as a lawyer. As a party 
litigant, moreover, a lawyer could represent himself is he so chose. 
Implicit in the right of self-representation is the right of representation 
by retained counsel of one's choosing. A party litigant does not lose 
this right merely because he is a lawyer and therefore subject to DR 
5-
102 [the Massachusetts rule that corresponds with Rule 3.7]. 
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Id.at 1000 (quoting from Borman v. Borman, 393 N.E.2d 847, 856 
(Mass. 1979). 
The Supreme Court also concluded that the conflicts of interest rules 
did not preclude a lawyer from representing himself in the defense of 
a 
malpractice claim brought by an alleged former client. Among other things, 
the Court said that by filing her malpractice action against her alleged 
former lawyers Farrington "has waived any right to suggest that the lawyers 
will violate Rules 1.7 and 1.9 [conflict of interest rules] by taking an 
adverse position to her in the suit she had brought against them." Id. at 
1001. 
However, the Court said that if "during the course of these 
proceedings, the combined role of lawyer and party is abused, the trial 
judge, in his discretion, may impose whatever sanctions are necessary to 
insure the orderly conduct of the proceedings including requiring 
defendants to procure independent counsel to conduct the adversarial 
proceedings." Id. at 1001. 
I. Conflicts of Interest 
Rule 1.7 is the basic rule on conflicts of interest. It provides, among 
other things, that: 
(a) 
A 
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that 
client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) 
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not 
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and 
(2) 
Each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that 
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities 
to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, 
unless: 
(1) 
The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and 
(2) 
The client consents after consultation. 
An interesting 1.7 issue came up in 
a 
recent federal district court case. 
In re Suard Barge Services Inc. 
1997 WL 703000 
(E.
D. La. 1997), (not officially reported) 
Windham sustained a "catastrophic" head injury while aboard a barge 
that was owned by Suard Barge Services. He wife, as conservator, sued 
Suard and Hopson Marine Transportation in state court. The defendants, 
in 
turn, brought a limitation of liability suit against Windham in federal court. 
Windham was represented in both courts by attorney Best. In the 
federal lawsuit, Best subpoenaed Gray Insurance, the insurer of the prior 
owner of the barge, to obtain records about 
a 
similar accident that had taken 
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place on the barge when it was owned by Grand Isle Shipyards. Gray 
refused to provide copies of records to Best. Best filed a motion to compel 
against Gray. 
Grand Isle and Gray moved to disqualify Best from representing 
Windham on the ground that Best had previously represented Gray in an 
unrelated matter at the same time that Best had been representing Windham. 
In an evidentiary hearing, Best testified that his firm had received only one 
assignment from Gray in the prior 6 years. However, Best conceded that 
his law firm had been counsel for Gray in that matter at the time he was 
hired by Windham. Best withdrew from that matter after the conflict of 
interest issue arose. 
Best argued against disqualification on the ground, among others, that 
Windham had not asserted any claim for damages against Gray. The 
question, though, was whether the subpoena and the motion to compel were 
sufficient to make Best "directly adverse" to Gray. Here is what the 
magistrate thought: 
On this record, 
I 
do not find that the subpoena itself was "directly 
adverse" to Gray's interests. However, 
I
find that Windham's motion 
to compel and for sanctions, filed while Best represented both 
Windham and Gray, was directly adverse to Gray. The comments to 
the Model Rules state that "a lawyer may not act as advocate against 
a 
client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even 
if 
the other 
matter is wholly unrelated." ... Best is clearly acting as an advocate 
against Gray, who was a current client in another matter, and Gray 
will obviously be prejudiced if sanctions are assessed against it. 
1997 WL at 
3. The magistrate said that Best violated Rule 1.7. What about 
disqualification? Here, the magistrate did not think that Best should be 
altogether disqualified from representing Windham. Disqualification was 
never "automatic." Best could continue to represent Windham, but could 
not do so in connection with matters concerning Gray (the subpoena and the 
motion for sanctions). 




Smith: Legal Ethics - A Few Things You Should Know
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 1996
